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Counterterrorism and Conflict 
Resolution in Northern Ireland
Martin Mansergh
The results of the recent election to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the first visit in 100 years by a British monarch to what is now the Republic of Ireland represent a consolidation 
of what has been achieved by the peace process. The Unionist community emphatically endorsed 
the leadership of Peter Robinson and the DUP and the political arrangement that they manage, 
with Robinson extraordinarily invoking the spirit of murdered PSNI constable Ronan Kerr in 
his victory comments. If Sinn Féin is losing its hold in Republican areas, as dissidents claim, 
there was little sign of it in election results, with the gain of one seat, including the win of 
five out of six seats in West Belfast with two-thirds of the vote, despite the departure south 
to the Dáil by Gerry Adams. As was realized up to 30 years ago, political harmony in Northern 
Ireland has to be embedded in a strong and positive British-Irish relationship, underlined by 
last week’s visit of British Queen and Prime Minister. Traditional hesitations meant that the 
visit was not rushed into, but nor, 13 years after the Good Friday Agreement, could it have 
been indefinitely deferred.
I am delighted to share this platform with Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s chief of staff, who did an 
incredible amount of groundwork in relation to Northern Ireland, and who came to the problem without 
hidebound ideological or inherited attitudes, and who was prepared to venture places where none before 
him were able or would have chosen to go. I was only one of his opposite numbers on the Irish side, 
and at an early stage not the most important. Our paths diverged in 2002, when I went for election, 
in what turned out to be a nine-year membership of the Irish Parliament, first in the Senate, then in 
the Dáil. We spent a few days together in December 2007, sharing and discussing insights with Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot negotiators on the peace line in December 2007. Like others who were involved, 
both of us have been drawn into comparative analysis, relating to conflict in other parts of the world.
Counterterrorism and conflict resolution, while clearly related, are not the same thing. Terrorism was a 
word used sparingly, if at all, by Irish Governments over the quarter century of conflict between 1969 
and 1994. It implied not just a strong rejection of the IRA campaign of violence, but it could also have 
signalled a narrow view of the solutions, more anti-terrorism laws and security force personnel, and 
more ruthless tactics up to and beyond the rule of law. Whether or not such measures contained the 
spread of conflict, they also helped prolong it, by creating new landmark causes, such as Bloody Sunday, 
the hunger strikes, shoot to kill, collusion, the legacy of all of which has been difficult to clear up even 
today. In fairness, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, at vast cost and over many years, did finally achieve its 
objective to the satisfaction of most reasonable people, including the majority of victims’ relatives.
The point made by Professor Daniel Wilson in an article on the failed Fenian invasion of Canada in 
1866 in the November/December 2008 issue of History Ireland about the problem facing Thomas 
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D’Arcy McGee, former Young Irelander, later 
Canadian cabinet minister, ‘how could they defeat a 
revolutionary minority inside an ethno-religious group 
without alienating the moderate majority within that 
group’, and without creating public sympathy for 
extremists, has a universal contemporary validity. 
Indeed, the whole purpose of the peace process was 
to shift from trying to inflict defeat on an isolated 
section of the population, to trying to find a new and 
far-reaching accommodation for the many legitimate 
and powerful conflicting interests and identities in 
Northern Ireland, while leaving the long-term future 
open. Nothing less than a substantial replacement of 
the 1920-1 settlement was needed. The boundary 
remained in place, but the basis on which it rested 
was thoroughly overhauled.
There is a separate discussion about how the situation 
was allowed to fester, then get out of hand, and 
whether the conflict needed to be so prolonged. The 
dominant inter-governmental effort for more than 20 
years was to try and create a centre ground, rigorously 
excluding and condemning paramilitary movements, 
with a view to achieving an agreement that would 
isolate extremists and legitimize a tough and conclusive 
security end-game. With the exception of Brian 
Faulkner, unionists never bought into a strategy which 
required major concessions from them, without any 
guarantee of an end to violence.
Both the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements of 
1973 and 1985, respectively, were in that mould, the 
first aspiring much more than the second to provide 
comprehensive conflict resolution. The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement was more of a counter-terrorism strategy, 
and not only from the rather obvious security orientation 
of Mrs. Thatcher. Dr. FitzGerald had a burning sense 
of danger that the nationalist community might give 
majority support to Sinn Féin, while the IRA was still at 
war, enabling it to claim further legitimation of armed 
struggle. The Agreement, which created a channel for 
the constitutional nationalist SDLP, through the Irish 
Government’s representing it at the Intergovernmental 
Conference and through a permanent secretariat, was 
actually a far more successful counterterrorist strategy 
in the political sense than any initiatives, including 
extradition, on the security front. The check to Sinn 
Féin’s electoral advance in Northern Ireland, and, 
south of the border, their minimal showing in the 
1987 General Election with 1.2% of the vote, were 
an important part of the background to the start of 
the peace process.
People engage in conflict, as they do in politics, 
to obtain something for themselves and for their 
supporters, and hence to be able both to deliver 
and to protect. As long as insurgent movements 
believe that some of their maximal demands are 
achievable through force, or, alternatively, that they 
have something that they need to protect (for example, 
territories and populations largely under their de 
facto control), their main interest in dialogue will 
be in seeking confirmation that they are winning. 
Dialogue has dangers that can reinforce violence. 
The difficulty is in judging when it might genuinely be 
the start of a search for a way out and for a credible 
political alternative.
The question may be asked, from the point of view 
of the insurgent movement, should the dialogue be 
with the enemy or enemies, who hold most of the 
power, should it be with bona fide and disinterested 
third parties; or should it be with other political forces 
that represent the population or community from 
which they come. The Northern Irish and indeed other 
experiences would suggest that all three elements are 
necessary in constructing a package, which would end 
or suspend conflict and lead to negotiation.
One of the advantages in the Northern Ireland 
situation is that the British Government, implicitly 
or explicitly, has always recognized the legitimacy 
of a united Ireland, provided it is brought about 
peacefully by agreement and consent, something 
easier perhaps to concede because of the unlikelihood 
of its achievement at an early date. This contrasts 
with the situation in the Basque Country, Sri Lanka 
and, indeed, Palestine, where the radical solution is 
out of the question. The issue in the early stages of 
the peace process was, could enough be built around 
this recognition of a united Ireland as a legitimate aim 
to construct an ideological bridge that would allow 
a cross-over into politics. Two ideas were developed 
in dialogue, part in the open with the SDLP, part in 
secret with both Governments separately. The first 
strand was the British Government explicitly stating, 
14
in the context of the ending of the cold war, that it 
had no selfish strategic (i.e. defence) interest in holding 
onto Northern Ireland, unlike perhaps the late 1940s, 
and then, more obviously, that it had no economic 
reasons either. A political interest in maintaining the 
Union is another matter. The second strand was to 
develop the idea of self-determination, never accepted 
by Britain at the time of the Anglo-Irish Treaty; this 
was to be exercised concurrently as would have to be 
the case in all long-partitioned countries. Ideological 
positions do matter. One of the comments made 
recently regarding Al-Qaeda has been the loss of 
traction regarding the theocratic aim of restoring the 
Caliphate, especially in the light of the Arab Spring. If 
ideological conflict can be softened, better still if some 
accommodation can be reached, then more practical 
issues for a peace settlement can be addressed. 
There were three stages in the Northern Ireland peace 
process. The first, from 1987 to 1994, was the slow 
establishment of principles and understandings that 
would lead to definitive ceasefires. The second, from 
1994 to 1998, including a period when the IRA 
ceasefire broke down, was to negotiate a political 
peace settlement that would underpin the ceasefires, 
in which powerful, and relatively neutral, US brokerage 
was an important element. The third stage, from 
1998 to close to the present, has been to flesh out 
and implement the Good Friday Agreement, one of 
the best examples being the reform of policing and 
then the successive buying into by different sections 
of the nationalist community.
One of the main obstacles to maintaining rapid 
momentum was the difficulty of obtaining clarity 
about renunciation of both the threat and the 
means of renewed violence.The section on weapons 
decommissioning in the Good Friday Agreement was 
weak and aspirational,albeit the best that could be 
obtained at the time, but subsequent events forced 
the issue  and rendered it central to the survival of the 
overall political strategy. I remember a few years ago 
being asked on local radio if I trusted the Sinn Féin 
leadership. My answer was that I trusted the necessities 
they were under. For all the criticisms that might be 
made of them, the Sinn Féin leadership in the North 
have, in the absence of any sort of a military victory, 
achieved what few other insurgent groups around 
the world have succeeded in doing, making a 
convincing transition into exclusively democratic 
politics. The political process, and the agreements 
underpinning it, have overwhelming support 
throughout the island, even with the initially sceptical 
DUP having taken over on the unionist side. However, 
there remains the threat and the reality of limited but 
persistent terrorist violence, demonstrated 13 years 
ago by the major casualties of the Omagh bomb, and 
more recently by three security force murders in the 
last three years. 
Should violent dissident organisations be treated the 
same or differently? I was intrigued to hear Gerry 
Adams recently compare the Real IRA and related 
organisations to the Baader Meinhoff gang and the 
red brigade, – by implication, on par with marginal 
groups that could be contained, that would eventually 
go away, and that did not need to be negotiated 
with. Many governments have learnt the importance 
of avoiding counterproductive overreaction that 
might generate emotive secondary causes. These 
can be gratefully seized upon as a substituted and 
more plausible basis for violence. The most effective 
countermeasure remains the continued, overwhelming 
rejection of their methods by the community from 
which they spring, and avoiding situations which allow 
them to claim that they are gaining popular ground.
Undoubtedly, the fortunes or misfortunes of well-
known groups employing similar methods around 
the world have some impact on morale. Unless 
there is some point, some potential gain to be made 
from a campaign it may, under continued security, 
political and popular pressure, eventually implode. 
Integral to terror is the making of bombastic claims 
by small groups about the number of potential 
targets and victims, often given credibility by the 
awe with which they are covered in the media and 
by a carefully nurtured mystique, largely inaccessible 
to challenge. In an age when at any rate European 
Governments have outlawed both capital and corporal 
punishment as incompatible with human rights, such 
groups arrogate to themselves reactionary powers 
and methods. Governments change, when the 
electorate from time to time so decide. Paramilitary 
groups are impervious to lack of electoral support, 
and put up pseudo-historicist or -legal arguments 
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that would not survive searching analysis and that are not 
often enough challenged. The notion that continued 
recourse to terrorism, even on a much reduced scale, 
will eventually wear down the opposition, whether 
unionist or British, ludicrously underestimates the 
staying-power of both.
Democratic conflict resolution, underpinned by a firm 
but not excessive security policy, is by far the most 
effective way of dealing with a terrorist problem. 
Ireland today faces other existential challenges. 
For the moment, Britain and America present 
friendly faces, compared to some of the demands 
emanating from France and Germany as the leading 
European countries.
It is not obvious that a united Ireland, even were it now 
achievable and however desirable from a longer-term 
point of view, is immediately relevant to the resolution 
of our financial and economic problems, or even 
credible in that context. The peaceful accommodation 
that has been achieved, and that seems likely to last, 
can and does contribute, and has the capacity, if 
unforced, to evolve much further in reducing barriers. 
Incremental progress will go on, but with the input 
sought of all involved, and with all significant political 
forces on board.  
